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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION AND RELATED WORK
With the development of deep neural networks (DNNs) and the availability of high
quality labeled medical imaging datasets, DNN based medical imaging systems have substantially increased the accuracy and efficiency of the clinical prediction tasks. For example, Daniels et al. [4] extract features from X-rays for lung disease classification, Shaffie et
al. [28] detect lung cancer using computed tomography (CT) scans and Reda et al. [25]
make an early diagnosis of prostate cancer using magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) scans.
Recently, several healthcare start-ups such as Zebra Medical Vision and Aidoc announced
U.S. Food & Drug Administration (FDA) clearances for their AI medical imaging systems.
These FDA approvals indicate that DNN based medical imaging systems are potentially
applicable for clinical diagnosis in the near future.
In parallel to the progress in DNN based medical imaging systems, the so-called adversarial images have exposed vulnerabilities of these systems in different clinical domains
[7]. Adversarial images are inputs of deep learning models that are intentionally crafted to
fool the trained models. Recent studies [23, 22] have specifically explored the reliability of
DNN models in both classification and segmentation tasks of medical imaging. They show
that these medical DNN models can be even more vulnerable to adversarial samples compared to natural image models. With human imperceptible perturbations added to clean
images, adversarial samples can completely fool the trained DNN model into making incorrect predictions. To generate adversarial samples, various types of methods have been
proposed, such as Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) [8] and its variant with stronger
attacks Projected Gradient Descent (PGD) [20], and optimization-based attack Carlini &
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Figure 1: An adversarial attack against a medical image classifier with perturbations generated using FGSM [8].
Wagner (C&W) [1]. For segmentation tasks, Ozbulak et al. [22] propose an adaptive
segmentation mask attack (ASMA), which produces a crafted mask to fool the trained
DNN model. Figure 1 shows how a clean image is manipulated to attack a medical image
classification system. With only imperceptibly small perturbations added to a clean X-ray
image, the system incorrectly classifies “Pleural Thickening" as “Pneumothorax". Consequently, without proper safeguards, users of such systems can be exposed to unforeseen
hazardous situations, such as diagnostic errors, medical reimbursement fraud and so on.
Therefore, an effective defense strategy needs to be implemented before these systems can
be safely deployed.
To defend against these adversarial attacks, an array of strategies have been developed.
One major line of those methods is adversarial training (AT) [20], which improves model’s
adversarial robustness by augmenting the training set with adversarial samples. However,
AT for DNNs in medical imaging is problematic as they are primarily designed for natural
images and require a large labeled training set [29] whereas medical data sets are usu-
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ally with a small number of labeled samples. Recently several techniques are proposed
to improve the effectiveness of defensive methods for medical images. In segmentation
tasks, He et al. [10] find that global contexts and global spatial dependencies are effective
against adversarial samples, thus they propose a non-local context encoder in the medical image segmentation system to improve adversarial robustness. In classification tasks,
Taghanaki et al. [30] use a radial basis mapping kernel to transform and separate features
on a manifold to diminish the influence of adversarial perturbation. Based on features
extracted from a trained DNN model, Ma et al. [19] attempt to distinguish adversarial
samples from clean ones via density estimation in the subspace of deep features learned
by a classification model. Although it achieves impressive performance, the so-called ‘detection’ methods rely on estimating the density of adversarial samples, e.g., via local [18]
or Bayesian uncertainty [6] approaches, consequently the effectiveness is limited to the
attack methods that are previously seen.
In this thesis, we propose two defending methods to tackle the challenges mentioned
above. To defend against diverse unseen attacks, we propose a robust detection strategy for adversarial images that can effectively thwart the adversarial attacks against DNN
based medical image classification systems. Inspired by [33], we focus on unsupervised
abnormal detection using features extracted from a trained CNN classifier. Our approach
does not assume any prior knowledge of attack methods, hence it can robustly defend
against diverse unseen attacks, white-box or black-box. For the small data problem, in
addition to the unsupervised abnormal detection strategy, we present a hybrid approach
that enhances defensive performance using semi-supervised adversarial training (SSAT)
and unsupervised adversarial detection (UAD). Specifically, we utilize both labeled and
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unlabeled data to generate pseudo-labels for SSAT to improve the robustness of class prediction. Furthermore, both defense strategies can be easily incorporated in any medical
imaging system without modifying the architecture nor compromising the performance.
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CHAPTER 2 THE ROBUST DETECTION METHOD
In this chapter, we present the proposed robust detection method. We start from the
analysis of the unique properties of adversarial attacks on medical imaging AI systems.
Then we describe our detection module equipped with three different unsupervised abnormal detection techniques.

2.1

Motivation

The adversarial image is crafted by adding subtle perturbations to the original image;
as a result, the perturbations at the pixel level look like noise which do not impede human
recognition. However such noise is influential at feature levels of CNN models. We demonstrate these characteristics of adversarial medical images by visualizing the feature maps
of a CNN model. In Figure 2a, given one clean X-ray image (top left) and its adversarial
counterpart (top right), the corresponding feature maps extracted from the first block of
a DenseNet-121 [11] are shown in bottom left and bottom right, respectively. It suggests
that adversarial perturbations, albeit are subtle at the pixel level and hard to be detected
by human eyes, lead to substantial “noise" at feature levels.
Furthermore, this “noise" can be exacerbated by the convolution-pooling operations
implemented in CNN models during forward propagation [32], and finally leads to misclassification. On the other hand, since the magnitude of perturbations increases layer by
layer, the clean and adversarial images can be easily distinguished based on the high-level
features. This assumption is verified from Figure 2b, which visualizes feature distributions
of clean and adversarial X-ray images extracted from the final fully connected layer of the
DenseNet-121 using t-SNE method. All X-ray images are randomly selected, which cover
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Figure 2: (a) Visualization of input images and feature maps from the first block of a
DenseNet-121 [11]. (b) Visualization of feature distributions from the final fully connected
layer of clean X-ray images (green) versus adversarial X-ray images (red).
different types of pathologies. It is obvious that the clean images can be modeled as a
unimodal multivariate density (green) whereas adversarial images (red) can be treated as
outliers. Different from natural images that may be affected by changes in lighting and
position, medical images are highly standardized since they are generally captured with
pre-defined and well-established positioning and exposure. Consequently, the trained DNN
based imaging system is more sensitive to these crafted perturbations.

2.2

Methods

We propose to augment the medical image classification system with an adversarial
image detection module. Figure 3 illustrates an example framework of the chest X-ray
disease classification system equipped with our detection module. After training the CNN
classifier with all clean images to extract the high-level features for learning the detection
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Figure 3: The proposed defense framework for a chest X-ray disease classification system
equipped with our MGM detection module.
module, the lower panel illustrates the process of detection and testing. Given a new (clean
or adversarial) image, the system extracts features using the trained CNN classifier as the
input of detection module. The input image is rejected if detected as an adversarial image,
otherwise, it continues to the loss layer to predict classification labels. To accommodate
diverse adversarial attacks, we use unsupervised anomaly detection techniques for the
detection module. Specifically, we use unimodal multivariate Gaussian model (MGM) as
the attacker detection method whereas Isolation Forest (ISO) [17] and One-class SVM
(OCSVM) [27] as competing methods.
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The high-level feature distribution of clean images can be modeled using MGM: z ∼
N (µ, Σ), where z represents the feature extracted using the final fully connected layer
given a clean input image x. The µ ∈ Rd and Σ ∈ Rd×d are mean vector and covariance
matrix, where d denotes dimension of MGM. Given features extracted from clean training
images Z = {z 1 , . . . , z n }, we estimate
n

n

1X
1X
zi, Σ =
(z i − µ)(z i − µ)T + λI,
µ=
n i=1
n i=1

(2.1)

where λI is the non-negative regularization added to the diagonal of covariance matrix.
After training MGM, for a new (clean or adversarial) image x∗ , we compute the probability of z ∗ = H(x∗ ) belonging to the clean image distribution by:

p(z ∗ ) =

1
exp (− (z ∗ − µ)T Σ−1 (z ∗ − µ)).
2
(2π) |Σ|
1
d
2

1
2

(2.2)

However, in practice, the high dimension, i.e., d = 1024, makes p(z ∗ ) computational expensive, and the value of p(z ∗ ) is so close to zero that cause arithmetic underflow. To
overcome these technical difficulties, we use Cholesky decomposition to re-parametrize
the covariance matrix: Σ = RRT and rewrite the probability density function into log
form:
d
X
1
log p(z ) = − [2 × (
Rii ) + ∥R−1 (z ∗ − µ)∥2 + d log(2π)].
2
i=1
∗

(2.3)

Finally, as shown in the Figure 3, x∗ will be detected as an adversarial image and rejected
if log p(z ∗ ) is lower than a threshold. The threshold can be determined by keeping 95% of
the training data as clean images.
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ISO algorithm builds an isolation tree (itree) by recursively dividing Z with a random
feature and a random cut-off value. By creating many itrees, the average path length
of unsuccessful search c(n) is used to assign the anomaly score: s(z, n) = 2(−E(h(z))/c(n)) ,
where E(h(z)) is the average path length of a single input z. The new (clean or adversarial) image x∗ is rejected if s(z ∗ , n) is close to 1. OCSVM is another competitor used in our
experiment, it can be summarized as mapping the clean training data z to a feature space
and finding the maximal margin which separates the mapped data from the origin. In our
context, let Φ to be the kernel function that transforms z to another space, and w and ρ
are the parameters to be learned to characterize the maximal margin. After training, given
a new (clean or adversarial) image x∗ , it will be detected as an adversarial image if the
decision function
f (z ∗ ) = sgn((w · Φ(z ∗ )) − ρ) = −1.

2.3
2.3.1

(2.4)

Experiments
Dataset

To verify the performance of our proposed defense approach on medical image classification, experiments are conducted on a large public chest X-ray dataset. The NIH ChestXray14 [31] contains 112,120 frontal-view chest X-rays taken from 30,805 patients, where
around 46% images are labeled with at least one of 14 pathologies. Following the preprocessing of [31], we split the dataset into training, validation and testing datasets by a
ratio of 7:1:2 for the image classification system which is DenseNet-121 in our experiment.
The features extracted from the entire clean training and validation datasets are used for
training and validating the detection module. We then randomly select 1000 clean im-
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ages from the testing dataset for crafting adversarial images using four adversarial attack
methods, i.e., fast gradient sign method (FGSM) [8], projected gradient descent (PGD)
[20], basic iterative method (BIM) [15], and momentum iterative method (MIM) [5] (the
winner of NIPS 2017 adversarial attacks competition). For each attack method, we craft
1000 adversarial images based on the 1000 clean images.
2.3.2

Attacks

We evaluate our defense approaches (MGM, ISO and SVM) against the four attack
methods mentioned above. Two attack settings are used in the experiment. 1) White-box
Attack: attackers know all details of the true CNN classifier (DenseNet-121), and directly
use gradients from the model to craft adversarial images. 2) Black-box Attack: attackers know nothing about the true CNN classifier and use an arbitrary substitute classifier
(ResNet-50 [9]) to craft adversarial images. Since the disease classification problem is a
multiple binary classification problem and attackers would not know the true label, for
each clean image, we use the class with the highest predicted probability to craft the adversarial images. The perturbations are calculated by using the gradient of cross-entropy
loss function on the selected class. To ensure the perturbations are subtle enough to remain undetectable from human recognition, the maximum perturbation is limited by 0.05
for black-box setting and 0.02 for white-box setting.

MIM
0.500 / 0.719 ± 0.077
0.837 / 0.801 ± 0.083
0.859 / 0.792 ± 0.089
0.957 / 0.818 ± 0.083

MIM
0.500 / 0.591 ± 0.063
0.874 / 0.810 ± 0.083
0.931 / 0.816 ± 0.094
0.975 / 0.820 ± 0.089

Table 1: F1 scores are shown for comparing detection performance and AUROC values weighted average over 14 different
classes with standard deviation are shown for comparing classification performance of each attack-defense combination.

White-box Attack (F1 / AUROC ± STD)
Attacks
FGSM
BIM
PGD
No Defense 0.500 / 0.702 ± 0.063
0.500 / 0.617 ± 0.071
0.500 / 0.616 ± 0.071
ISO
0.838 / 0.786 ± 0.077
0.874 / 0.810 ± 0.083
0.874 / 0.810 ± 0.083
SVM
0.870 / 0.783 ± 0.077
0.931 / 0.816 ± 0.083
0.931 / 0.816 ± 0.089
MGM
0.936 / 0.801 ± 0.089 0.975 / 0.820 ± 0.089 0.975 / 0.820 ± 0.089
Black-box Attack (F1 / AUROC ± STD)
Attacks
FGSM
BIM
PGD
No Defense 0.500 / 0.749 ± 0.077
0.500 / 0.737 ± 0.077
0.500 / 0.741 ± 0.077
ISO
0.871 / 0.810 ± 0.083
0.759 / 0.777 ± 0.089
0.735 / 0.776 ± 0.089
SVM
0.903 / 0.812 ± 0.077
0.777 / 0.781 ± 0.083
0.754 / 0.776 ± 0.083
MGM
0.958 / 0.819 ± 0.083 0.924 / 0.809 ± 0.089 0.903 / 0.808 ± 0.083
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2.3.3

Metrics

We evaluate our defense approach against each attack method based on detection performance and follow-up classification performance. The detection performance is evaluated by F1 score, representing the best trade-off between precision and recall. For comparing performance of the follow-up classification, we use AUROC weighted average from
14 different classes because ROC curve has the advantage of determining the optimal cut
off values for classification decisions based on the class probabilities.
2.3.4

Results

Table 1 shows the detection performance for each attack-defense combination under
both white-box and black-box settings. Since the testing dataset consists of 1000 clean
images and 1000 adversarial images, the F1 score of the classification system without a
detection module (the weak baseline) is always 0.5. All detection methods demonstrate
robust performance against these attacks under the white-box setting with MGM has the
best performance. We note that the adversarial images crafted using one-step FGSM [8],
an earlier adversarial attack method, are more effective compared to others under the
white-box setting evident by a lower F-1 score. Similar to the white-box setting, MGM
demonstrates the best performance among all detection methods against all attacks under
the black-box setting where the architecture of the true CNN classifier is unknown to the
attackers. However, the trend is reversed under the black-box setting that adversarial
images crafted using one-step FGSM are easier to be detected compared to others. We
explain this phenomenon below.
Since detection is based on the features extracted from the true CNN classifier, an ad-
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versarial image is easier to be detected if it is contaminated with more “noise” at feature
levels. Under the white-box setting, adversarial images crafted from the iterative methods
(e.g., BIM, PGD, MIM) are easier to be detected because they iteratively increase perturbations to maximize the “noise” at feature levels. However, under the black-box setting,
adversarial images are crafted using a substitute classifier (ResNet-50), which can be quite
different from the true CNN classifier (DenseNet-121). Thus adversarial images crafted by
the iterative methods can maximize “noise” for the substitute classifier but not for the true
CNN classifier, making it much lower “noise” at feature levels thus harder to be detected.
We also report the follow-up classification performance in Table 1 under both whitebox and black-box settings, which is consistent with detection performance. The system
equipped with the MGM detection module has the best performance among all detection
methods under both settings evident by the highest AUROC values. It is interesting to
point out that the proposed framework with a detection module, such as MGM under the
white-box setting, can has a better classification performance on mixed clean and adversarial images (0.820) than the true CNN classifier tested only on clean images (0.817),
which is possibly due to: (1) the detection module effectively rejects all adversarial images, ensuring the system’s non-compromised classification performance as using a clean
dataset, and (2) the detection module can also erroneously reject some clean images as
adversarial images. These clean images can be problematic for the CNN classifier since
they are at tails of the distribution. Therefore, rejecting these clean images can improve
classification performance.
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CHAPTER 3 THE UAD COMPLEMENTED WITH SSAT METHODS
In this chapter, we mainly tackle the label scarcity challenge in the medical images
against adversarial attacks. Specifically, we propose a novel robust medical imaging AI
framework based on SSAT and UAD, followed by designing a new measure for assessing
systems adversarial risk.

3.1

Motivation

Figure 4: T-SNE visualization of penultimate layer activations of the model trained on
the OCT dataset [14]. The clean images are represented by solid circles with each color
represents a true class. The adversarial samples (triangles) are crafted by PGD with a
perturbation budget ϵ = 0.005 where each color represents a predicted class. For each
class, UAD is capable of filtering out the majority of adversarial samples (center) and
SSAT enables the model to correctly predict the rest of adversarial samples (close to clean
images).
Compared to the natural imaging, medical imaging AI systems can be more susceptible to adversarial attacks [19] since medical images are highly standardized with wellestablished exposure and quality control, featuring a significant overlap in fore- and backgrounds, which is the so-called “hard sample problem" [16]. Thus a small adversarial
perturbation on the entire clean images can significantly distort their distribution in the
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latent feature space, which can be detrimental to the model performance. As shown in
Figure 4, the vast majority of adversarial samples deviate significantly from the distribution of clean samples, implying that they are hard samples for supervised classification.
Consequently, an unsupervised detection module is necessary [19].
While filtering out the hard samples, correctly predicting adversarial samples that are
closed to the clean images is also important. As discussed before, AT is an effective way
to improve the adversarial robustness of natural image classifiers but is problematic for a
medical image classifiers due to the label scarcity problem. In order to train the AI system
with a small set of labeled images to improve adversarial robustness against unseen and
heterogeneous attacks, instead of performing supervised adversarial training, we take a
different perspective via unsupervised detection of adversarial samples without the need
for estimating the density of the adversarial samples. We present a hybrid approach that
enhances DNN defensive performance using semi-supervised adversarial training (SSAT)
and unsupervised adversarial detection (UAD). Specifically, we utilize both labeled and
unlabeled data to generate pseudo-labels for SSAT to improve the robustness of class prediction. To mitigate the distribution distortion of unseen adversarial samples, we employ
UAD to screen out those adversarial samples in an effort to facilitate the correct prediction
of the rest of adversarial samples by model enhanced with SSAT (Figure 4).
Formally, the medical image classification problem is to train a prediction function fθ (·)
by minimizing the loss in mapping a clean image x ∈ X to its true label y. Due to the
existence of adversarial samples x′ ∈ X ′ , it is necessary to have a detection function gϕ (·)
that can distinguish whether an input of fθ is perturbed by an adversary. Ideally gϕ takes
inputs from both X and X ′ , rejects all x′ from X ′ , then fθ only takes x from X to make

16

Figure 5: The proposed robust OCT imaging classification system equipped with SSAT
and UAD modules.
predictions. A promising solution is to design a UAD function gϕ to reject all adversarial
samples from X ′ . However, it is a challenging task since some of adversarial samples are
very close to clean images (Figure 4). As such, a supervised prediction function fθ that is
capable of correctly classifying those adversarial samples using a limited labeled training
set is also indispensable for maximizing the defense effectiveness.

3.2

Method

Figure 5 illustrates our adversarial defense approach. During training (Figure 5a), we
learn the robust feature representation via SSAT for both prediction and UAD modules.
During inference (Figure 5b), given an unseen test image, the system extracts the feature
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as the input for UAD module. The test image is rejected if it is detected as an adversarial
sample, otherwise, it continues to the loss layer to predict a class label. We describe the
technical details of SSAT and UAD modules in the following subsections.
3.2.1

Semi-supervised Adversarial Training

Adversarial training (AT) [20] is a powerful way to improve the adversarial robustness
of a prediction module when the labeled training set is abundant. Recently adversarial
samples generated from unlabeled data with pseudo labels have been shown to be valuable
for improving the adversarial robustness [29]. For training the prediction module fθ with
labeled images, we use the supervised AT, i.e.,

Lsup (θ) = E

sup xent (y, fθ (x′ )) ,

x∈X x′ ∈Nϵ (x)

(3.1)

where xent is the cross-entropy loss, Nϵ (x) denotes the neighborhood of a clean image
x and ||x−x′ ||∞ < ϵ. The inner maximization can be approximated by any available attack
method, such as PGD and FGSM. For training with unlabeled images, we first find their
pseudo labels ŷ(x) predicted by fθ , followed by AT, i.e., minimizing

Lunsup (θ) = E

sup xent (ŷ(x), fθ (x′ )) .

x∈X x′ ∈Nϵ (x)

(3.2)

We then minimize the loss function to perform SSAT in an effort to enhance model’s
adversarial robustness:

Lsemi-sup (θ) = Lsup (θ) + λLunsup (θ),

(3.3)
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where λ is a hyper-parameter tunned based on relative abundances of labeled and unlabeled data.
3.2.2

Unsupervised Adversarial Detection

To filter out adversarial samples x′ from being fed into fθ , we design an UAD module gϕ
with the goal to exclude the majority of adversarial samples x′ ∈ X ′ , and simultaneously
prevent x ∈ X from being erroneously rejected. As shown in Figure 4, the clean images
have a different distribution from adversarial samples classified into the same class (color).
Inspired by this observation, we estimate a probability density only for clean images as the
UAD module and reject images deviating away from this density as adversarial samples.
Unlike the detection methods described in [18, 19, 6], our proposed UAD is completely
unsupervised that does not need to estimate the adversarial density in whatever way. As a
result, it is not limited to detecting the adversarial samples from the known attack types.
Specifically, let Z be the latent feature extracted from the penultimate layer of fθ using
x as input and we employ a Gaussian mixture model (GMM) for UAD module gϕ . Let
µij ∈ Rd and Σij ∈ Rd×d represents the mean and covariance matrix of the jth Gaussian
component of class i, respectively. For a single class, given all features extracted from clean
training samples Z = {z 1 , . . . , z n }, we can estimate parameters of the GMM using the EM
algorithm. The high dimension of Z may cause numerical issues during training. Thus a
small non-negative regularization is added to the diagonal of the covariance matrices to
alleviate these issues [24].
3.2.3

Adversarial Risk Evaluation

We propose a new adversarial risk evaluation measure for comparing systems performance in terms of adversarial defense. We assess the risk derived from clean images based
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Without UAD

With UAD

Clean Images
Adversarial
Images
Risk Correct Classification

Correct Rejection

Misclassification

Misrejection

Figure 6: An illustration of assessing systems adversarial risk. Note the system with UAD
on the right exhibits a much lower risk represented by smaller red zones.
on the following intuition: 1) a clean image incurs no risk if it can be correctly classified;
uad
; and 3) a clean image being
2) a clean image being rejected by the UAD incurs risk rcln
prd
accepted by the UAD but misclassified by prediction model incurs risk rcln
. Assume that
inc
for clean images, the number of accepted images that incorrectly predicted is Ncln
(f, g),
rej
and the number of clean images being rejected is Ncln
(g), the risk derived from misclas-

sifying (first term) and erroneously rejecting (second term) clean images is calculated as
prd
rej
inc
uad
Rcln (f, g) = Ncln
(f, g) · rcln
+ Ncln
(g) · rcln
. If only f is used to make predictions (without
inc
UAD), the second term is zeroed out. Lets denote Ncln
(f ) as the number of clean images
prd
inc
being misclassified by f , then the risk is calculated as Rcln (f ) = Ncln
(f ) · rcln
.

Similarly for adversarial samples, we have the following intuition: 1) being correctly
rejected by UAD or bypassed but correctly classified incurs no risk; and 2) being erroprd
neously accepted by UAD and misclassified incurs a risk radv
. Assume the number adverinc
sarial samples in 2) is Nadv
(f, g), the risk derived from adversarial samples is calculated
prd
inc
as Radv (f, g) = Nadv
(f, g) · radv
. When only f is used to make predictions (without UAD),
inc
inc
inc
since Nadv
(f, g) = Nadv
(f ) and Nadv
(f ) is the number of misclassified adversarial samples,
prd
inc
the risk is calculated as Radv (f ) = Nadv
(f ) · radv
. The total risk, incurred by both clean and

adversarial samples, thus can be calculated by R = Rcln + Radv . The value of different risks
uad prd prd
(rcln
, rcln , radv .) are determined empirically, then we have the risk measures for AI systems
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prd
rej
prd
uad
inc
inc
and without UAD
(g) · rcln
+ Nadv
(f, g) · radv
+ Ncln
with UAD as R(f, g) = Ncln
(f, g) · rcln
prd
prd
inc
inc
(f ) · radv
.
(f ) · rcln
+ Nadv
as R(f ) = Ncln

These evaluation measures are illustrated in Figure 6. Using the above equations, we
can assess and compare average adversarial risks between UAD based (r(f, g) = R(f, g)/N )
and not UAD based (r(f ) = R(f )/N ) defense approaches.

3.3

Experiments

We use experiments to demonstrate that: 1): The SSAT module can significantly increase model’s adversarial robustness without compromising classification performance of
clean images. 2) The UAD module can detect and exclude a majority of successful adversarial examples. 3) Our medical imaging AI system (UAD + SSAT) minimizes adversarial
risk compared to other existing AI systems.
3.3.1

Dataset and Experiment Settings

The experiments are conducted on a public retinal OCT image dataset, originally released in [14]. It contains 84,495 images taken from 4,686 patients with 4 classes:
choroidal neovascularization (CNV), diabetic macular edema (DME), drusen, and normal.
To demonstrate the advantages of using unlabeled images for semi-supervised training,
we randomly sample 4,000 images for training, 1,000 images for testing and additional
1,000 images as the unlabeled dataset for SSAT. The 4 classes are balanced in each data
set. Following the standard prepossessing [8], all images are center-cropped to 224 × 224
and all pixels are scaled to [0,1]. For AT and SSAT, we augment the data set by generating
adversarial samples for each mini-batch using FGSM with a uniformly sampling perturbation from the interval [0.001,0.003]. The number of adversarial and clean images remains
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1 : 1 within each mini-batch. We use ResNet-18 [9] pre-trained with ImageNet to learn
robust feature representations against adversarial attacks. The networks are trained with
the SGD optimizer for 10 epochs with a batch size of 64. We set λ = 5 for SSAT as in [29].
3.3.2

SSAT Performance

We evaluate class prediction performance under the most challenging threat: ‘whitebox’ setting [1]. Compared to the benign ‘white-box’ setting, the adversary possesses complete knowledge of the target model, including architecture and model parameters. We
compare our SSAT with three baseline methods in terms of classification accuracy: natural
training (NT) with cross-entropy loss, AT with cross-entropy loss [8] and NT with guided
complement entropy (GCE) loss [2]. The 1,000 attacks are crafted by 1-step FGSM, 10-step
PGD, and C&W.

Figure 7: The supervised prediction accuracy of the four trained models on 1000 adversarial examples crafted by FGSM, PGD, C&W with an increasing budget and constant c.

Figure 7 demonstrates that SSAT markedly outperforms other baselines in all white-box
attack settings while maintaining a comparable or better performance on the clean image
classification (when the perturbation budget is zero). The NT appears very susceptible
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to easy attacks generated using FGSM with a very small perturbation budget whereas
GCE and AT demonstrate a solid performance against easy attacks but fail under strong
attacks such as those generated using PGD and C&W. For AT, label scarcity has significantly
limited its adversarial generalizability. For GCE, widening the gap in the manifold between
different classes may not work well for medical images due to significant overlaps in both
the fore- and backgrounds.
Classes
NT
GCE
AT
SSAT

CNV
0.897
0.943
0.890
0.965

DME DRUSE
0.802 0.852
0.902 0.930
0.932 0.841
0.987 0.967

NORMAL
0.859
0.931
0.903
0.974

Average # cases
0.852
885
0.927
970
0.892
580
0.973
136

Table 2: UAD performance comparison using AUPRC under PGD attack with a perturbation ϵ = 0.005. The last column shows the number of successful adversarial samples.
Method
NT
GCE
Adversarial Risk w/o UAD 0.483 0.529
Adversarial Risk w. UAD 0.446 0.367
Adv Samples Accuracy
11.5% 0.3%

AT
0.324
0.317
42%

SSAT
0.112
0.108
86.4%

SSAT*
0.456
0.225
17.5%

Table 3: Systems risk under PGD attack with a perturbation ϵ = 0.005. SSTA* is the risk
under a stronger PGD attack (ϵ = 0.01).
3.3.3

UAD Performance

We use features extracted from 4000 clean images in the training set to estimate mixture model density for UAD. Then the 1000 images from test set and its successful adversarial counterparts are used for assessing performance of UAD. As shown in Table 2, UAD
is effective in detecting and excluding adversarial samples evident by high area under the
Precision-Recall curve (AUPRC) values among all settings. Furthermore, SSAT is more effective than other training strategies, i.e., NT, AT or GCE. Since the classes of clean images
and successful attacks are highly imbalanced (136:1000), AUPRC is a suitable metric for
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evaluation [26]. The average AUPRC value of 0.973 shows the proposed UAD can correctly
filter out a vast majority of adversarial samples.
3.3.4

Comparison of Adversarial Risks

Finally, we demonstrate that UAD complementing with SSAT gives rise to the lowest
adversarial risk in terms of the new measure proposed in Section 3.2.3. In Table 3, it is
clear that UAD based systems have consistently lower risks compared to those are not,
regardless of the training methods used. Note that the reduction of risk is not significant
for SSAT against PGD attacks with a smaller budget (ϵ = 0.005). The main reason is
that these adversarial samples are relatively weak (highest class prediction accuracy of
86.4% in the last row) that SSAT can successfully predict their labels without the need
for UAD. After we double the perturbation budget of PGD attack (ϵ = 0.01), as shown in
the last column, the adversarial risk decreases by half (from 0.456 to 0.225) with UAD,
highlighting the striking robustness of our system against stronger PGD attacks compared
with those without UAD.
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CHAPTER 4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This chapter gives a summary of the content and contributions of this thesis as well as
the possible extension of the proposed two methods. It also describes the direction of our
ongoing future work of building trustworthy medical imaging AI systems with adversarial
machine learning.

4.1

Conclusion

In this thesis, we propose two novel methods to defend adversarial attacks on medical
images: the robust detection method and UAD complemented with SSAT. The robust detection method detects the adversarial attacks by modeling the high-level features learned
from the clean images using a standard CNN classifier in an unsupervised abnormal detection way. Thus it can defend against diverse unseen attacks. To tackle the label scarcity
problem in training a robust classifier, the proposed UAD complemented with SSAT introduces the semi-supervised adversarial training which utilizes both labeled and unlabeled
data to improve the adversarial robustness of the class prediction. Through experiments,
our systems demonstrate superior performance in adversarial defense to competing techniques. Furthermore, Both strategies do not need any prior knowledge of attack methods
nor modification of the CNN architecture. As a result, these effective strategies can be
combined with other defense methods and are sufficiently flexible for many medical imaging applications with diverse image formats. We expect deployment of our approaches
would enhance the security of DNN based medical imaging classification systems. We will
try to extend the current method to accommodate more complex datasets that may follow
multimodal distributions and more medical image tasks such as segmentation. In addition,

25
we also plan to investigate new dimension reduction approaches to reduce the number of
training examples required to estimate the distribution.

4.2

Future Work

As discussed in previous chapters, DNNs have achieved state-of-art performance of an
array of challenging tasks in computer vision. However, there are still some barriers that
stop these successful technology transfers, especially in the safety-critical medical domain.
In addition to the adversarial attacks, the lack of explanation and transparency of the
model’s prediction may lead to a suboptimal decision in medical imaging applications. For
example, recent studies [21, 3] demonstrate that the prediction of these systems might
depend more on some unknown features generated by different medical devices with different manufacturing standards and acquisition parameters than the real relevant medical
information in the medical images. Those non-robust features is highly related to the adversarial perturbations, since both them are imperceptible to human and the latter are
usually defined as the worst cases. As a result, it could be argued that improving the
model’s adversarial robustness is expected to encourage the model to learn more robust
feature representation [12] that can further lead to better trustworthy medical imaging
applications.
To initially test this idea, experiments are conducted on the Object-CXR dataset [13],
which is a benchmark dataset for foreign object recognition and localization on Chest Xray images. We develop a Chest X-ray quality classification model with ResNet-18, which
predicts whether the input Chest X-ray contains foreign objects such as necklaces and
clothes zippers. Currently, we use adversarial training to increase the robustness of the
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Figure 8: Examples of heatmap interpretations of prediction by classification model trained
with standard training versus adversarial training. Robustly trained model has sharper and
visually coherent heatmaps.
classification model and AGI to inspect features used by the model to make a prediction.
Figure 8 shows the interpretation of prediction made by the models trained with different strategies. The key observation from the experiment is that the heatmap of the nonrobust model is far more sparse than the robust model trained with adversarial training.
As shown in the upper panel, the robust model has a sharper and more visually coherent
heatmap focus on the zipper slider which is the right reason to predict "Yes". In the lower
panel, when facing multiple objects in one X-ray image, the robust model can still highlight the right region such as steel ring and clips around the lung, while the non-robust
model relies on the irrelevant region of the heart to make a prediction. These preliminary results indicate that improving the model’s adversarial robustness will encourage the
model to learn robust features that agree with humans, thus improving interpretability in
the medical imaging classification model.
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In the future, instead of focusing on attack and defense games, we plan to investigate
the connection between the adversarial attacks and other important trustworthy AI topics
such as interpretability and fairness to remove barriers that prevent the medical imaging
applications from being deployed in real world.
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Although deep learning systems trained on medical images have shown state-of-theart performance in many clinical prediction tasks, recent studies demonstrate that these
systems can be fooled by carefully crafted adversarial images. It has raised concerns on
the practical deployment of deep learning based medical image classification systems. Although an array of defense techniques have been developed and proved to be effective in
computer vision, defending against adversarial attacks on medical images remains largely
an uncharted territory due to their unique challenges: crafted adversarial noises added
to a highly standardized medical image can make it a hard sample for model to predict and label scarcity limits adversarial generalizability. To tackle these challenges, we
propose two defending methods: one unsupervised learning approach to detect those
crafted hard samples and one robust medical imaging AI framework based on an additional Semi-Supervised Adversarial Training (SSAT) module to enhance the overall system
robustness, followed by a new measure for assessing systems adversarial risk. We systematically demonstrate the advantages of our methods over the existing adversarial defense

33
techniques under diverse real-world settings of adversarial attacks using benchmark X-ray
and OCT imaging data sets.
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